Thomas E. Hill, Jr., interprets and extends Kant's moral theory in a series of essays that highlight its relevance to contemporary ethics. He introduces the major themes of Kantian ethics and explores its practical application to questions about revolution, prison reform, and forcible interventions in other countries for humanitarian purposes.

This essay explains Kant’s general duty of beneficence and addresses the objections that as interpreted here the principle is too anemic (Cummiskey), that it requires us devalue our own happiness (Slote), and that it fails to acknowledge that some acts are good to do but not required (Urmson). The general duty leaves a wide area of free choice, but other moral considerations may affect the application of Kant’s principles to particular cases of philanthropic giving: justice, respect, the kind of help (...) needed, and the motives of the giver. (shrink)

This chapter describes and illustrates ideals of appreciation and positive expressions of respect in personal relationships and then argues that these are distinct from beneficence, that they are aspects of a full recognition of human dignity, and that they have important general and special implications for relationships involving persons with disabilities. The chapter emphasizes that especially among family, friends, and caregivers, proper respect for persons calls for positive affirmations and being open to appreciate the good in others and their lives (...) and that appreciating them is more than respecting them and caring for their comfort and happiness. Respect and appreciation for and by us, as persons with disabilities, requires confronting and changing cultural stigmas that undermine these morally important attitudes. (shrink)

Contemporary discussions of practical reason often refer vaguely to the Kantian conception of reasons as an alternative to various means-ends theories, but it is rarely clear what this is supposed to be, except that somehow moral concerns are supposed to fare better under the Kantian conception. The theories of Nagel, Gewirth, Darwall, and Donagan have been labeled “Kantian” because they deviate strikingly from standard preference models, but their roots in Kant have not been traced in detail and important differences may (...) go unnoticed. All this is not surprising, of course, because Kant’s conception of practical reason is inseparable from his ideas of freedom, which are notoriously difficult and controversial. It is hard enough to characterize these ideas accurately in Kantian terminology, harder still to explain them in terms of contemporary debates about reasons for action. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant defines virtue as a kind of strength and resoluteness of will to resist and overcome any obstacles that oppose fulfilling our moral duties. Human agents, according to Kant, owe it to ourselves to strive for perfect virtue by fully committing ourselves to morality and by developing the fortitude to maintain and execute this life-governing policy despite obstacles we may face. This essay reviews basic features of Kant’s conception of virtue and then discusses the role of emotions, a motive (...) of duty, exemplars, rules, and community in a virtuous life. Kant thinks that striving to be more virtuous requires not only respect for moral principles and control of our contrary emotions but also a system of legally enforced rules and communities of good persons. Exemplars and cultivated good feelings and emotions can also be useful aids along the way, but Kant warns us against attempting to derive our moral standards themselves from examples or feelings. The best any of us can hope for, in Kant’s view, is to make constant progress in our difficult struggle for moral perfection. (shrink)

Is Kantian Ethics guilty of utopian thinking? First, potentially good and bad uses of utopian ideals are distinguished, then an apparent path is traced from Rousseau’s unworkable political ideal to Kant’s ethical ideal. Three versions of Kant’s Categorical Imperative are examined briefly for the ways that they may raise the suspicion that they manifest or encourage bad utopian thinking. In each case Kantians have available responses to counter the suspicion, but special attention is directed to the version that says “Act (...) on the maxims of a universally law–giving member of a kingdom of ends.” Interpretations vary, but here primary focus is on one contemporary reconstruction and development of this central idea. Several objections suggest that this idea encourages bad utopian thinking are briefly addressed: that we cannot count on everyone to follow ideal rules, that even conscientious people disagree in their moral judgments, and that theories that allow exceptions to familiar moral rules create a “slippery slope” to moral chaos. (shrink)

Professor Hill delivered these comments as part of the International Society for Environmental Ethics panels on Environmental Virtue Ethics, held at the annual meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, April 2000, in Albuquerque, NM Philip Cafaro’s paper “Thoreau, Leopold and Carson: Toward an Environmental Virtue Ethics” appears in Environmental Ethics 23(2001), 3-17. Geoffrey Frasz’s paper “What is Environmental Virtue Ethics That We Should Be Mindful of It?” is published as part of this special issue of (...) Philosophy in the Contemporary World. (shrink)

In a morally perfect world we would not face many of the hard choices which confront us in the real world. If everyone were fully conscientious, moral dilemmas might still be posed by natural circumstances; but many of our most difficult and tragic choices would not arise. In particular, we would never need to decide whether we should ourselves do a lesser evil in order to prevent someone else from doing a greater one. Unfortunately we do not live in such (...) a perfect world. Through greed, malice, jealousy, false pride, or whatever, people are prepared to commit the most heinous crimes against innocent victims; and sometimes, it seems, they can be prevented only by means which no one would consider in the morally perfect world. One must choose among evils; doing a lesser evil oneself or allowing others to do an even greater evil. (shrink)

This new edition and translation of Kant's classic work on the fundamental questions of ethics is designed especially for students. An extensive and comprehensive introduction explains the central concepts of Groundwork and looks at Kant's main lines of argument. Detailed notes aim to clarify Kant's thoughts and to correct some common misunderstandings of his doctrines.

This book explores how different types of women’s status, including women’s inclusion (in politics), women’s rights, harm to women, and beliefs about women’s gender roles affect political violence, including interstate war, civil war, repression, and terrorism. However, it argues that before scholars, policymakers, and practitioners can explore these connections, it is important to overcome existing problems in the scholarship—conceptual stretching of gender equality and resulting measurement invalidity. Much of the current scholarship and policymaking conflate gender equality and women’s status. That (...) is, they use gender equality as a catchall term that includes anything related to women. This conflation masks the individual ways in which women’s status affects different forms of political violence. Scholars and policymakers also use a multitude of indicators to measure gender equality when in reality they are measuring other concepts. This book corrects these problems and develops novel concepts and scales to determine how women’s inclusion, women’s rights, harm to women, and beliefs about women’s roles affect interstate war, civil war, repression, and terrorism within a given society. It finds that women’s inclusion is associated with fewer terror attacks; women’s rights in combination with strong women’s advocacy groups are related to less state repression; harm to women is associated with a higher probability of civil and interstate wars; and beliefs about women’s traditional gender roles within a society are correlated with more terrorism. The findings shed light on the various pathways to reduce political violence globally. (shrink)

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What would Kantian constructivism be like as a normative (not metaethical) theory that focused on ethical, not political questions? This chapter first reviews conceptions of the normative/metaethical distinction, general features of _constructivism,_ and earlier versions of _Kantian_ constructivism described by Rawls, O’Neill, and Hill. The chapter then highlights features of the normative ethical theory that Kant developed in his late work, the Doctrine of Virtue (_The Metaphysics of Morals, Part II_), proposing that this can be viewed as a _normative_ (...) ethical theory with constructivist features separable from the more ambitious metaethical claims in the prominent Kantian constructivisms of Rawls and O’Neill. When interpreted in this way the Doctrine of Virtue fits well with the constructivist normative theory suggested by Kant’s later formulations of the Categorical Imperative in the _Groundwork_. _Finally_, the chapter responds to some of Onora O’Neill’s objections to partially similar constructivisms proposed by Rawls. (shrink)

This chapter describes elements of the broadly Kantian conception of _why_ certain rules are important, reviews some common objections, and considers these questions: (1) Is it morally important to have shared moral _rules_ about specific types of problems, rules that are distinct from laws of the state and yet not merely heuristic guides? (2) If there are such morally important rules, does their moral authority or the justifiability of particular moral judgments depend on more fundamental moral standards that can be (...) expressed in the form of _principles_? (3) If there are such fundamental moral principles, what sort of framework do they provide for deliberation about the content of moral rules, their limits, and the priorities among them? (4) If principles and rules are important, how can we respond to common objections to their use and abuse in philosophy and in ordinary decision making. The proposed answers, not surprisingly, are affirmative: (1) we need specific moral rules, (2) justification presupposes more general principles, as illustrated in a Kantian account of practical reason, (3) one sort of deliberative framework can be drawn from Kant’s basic moral principles, (4) common objections show the limits but not the unimportance of moral rules. All of these issues are controversial. The aim is not settle the disputes but to sketch a view of moral rules and principles worth taking seriously. The discussion sketches a reconstruction of Kant’s view of reasons and rational principles, distinguishes the pattern for hypothetical imperatives from the pattern for moral (categorical) imperatives, and then considers where in these patterns the “reasons” for action are Finally the chapter comments briefly on the familiar objections: (1) Rules are no substitute for good judgment, (2) Rule-worship is irrational, (3) Morality is not all about social rules, and (4) Moral thinking is not all about systems of possible rules. (shrink)

Kant’s formulations of the Categorical Imperative express basic requirements to universalize our maxims, respect humanity as an end in itself, and conform to the more specific moral principles that we do or would will as rational persons with autonomy. Kantians disagree about the interpretation and relative importance of these various formulations, but most now agree that, although they provide no algorithms, the formulations can be helpful in guiding moral deliberation and judgment. This chapter explains the basic features of the formulations, (...) reviews different interpretations, and notes various problems that each formulation raises. Views of Alan Donagan, Barbara Herman, Christine Korsgaard, Onora O’Neill, H.J. Paton, Thomas Pogge, John Rawls, and Allen Wood are reviewed briefly A primary aim is to call attention to the different ways in which contemporary Kantians have attempted to develop Kant’s normative ethics. A secondary aim is to show how Kantian ethics, under different interpretations, addresses the question when and why we are morally required to help others. Kant’s theory is justly famous for its insistence that pursuit of happiness, for oneself and others, is constrained by moral requirements of justice and respect for human dignity. Kant also argues, however, that it is categorically imperative for us to make it our maxim to promote the happiness of others. It is currently a matter of controversy how much latitude this requirement is supposed to leave us to pursue non-obligatory projects of our own. Focusing on beneficence to illustrate various contemporary developments in Kantian ethical theory helps to bring out similarities and differences among them and may reveal some relative strengths and weaknesses. (shrink)

What is it to treat someone as a person with dignity? There are no doubt some descriptive criteria for "treating a person as a person," but the idea of dignity implies something more. Drawing from Wittgenstein's famous duck-rabbit example, we might try to interpret “_seeing_ someone _as_ a person” in a more expressivist fashion. Though perhaps promising, this leaves open important ethical questions. The discussion turns, then, to Kant, who made the idea of dignity a center-piece in his moral theory. (...) After a review of basic features of Kant’s idea, the chapter expresses doubts about aspects of the interpretations proposed by some other commentators, notably, Marcus Singer, Alan Donagan, David Cummiskey, Christine Korsgaard, and Allen Wood. Kant's idea of dignity raises two important problems of application. The first is that it apparently generates conflicts of duty. The second is that, although it offers an appealing contrast to consequentialism, it imposes such severe constraints that its practical implications are often counter-intuitive. In particular, it seems to require strict conformity to moral principles that are appropriate for most conditions even when extraordinary circumstances make it reasonable to make exceptions. Arguably these problems are more manageable, however, if we use the idea of the dignity of persons at a second-order level of moral deliberation rather than case by case. The chapter pursues this suggestion by developing further some earlier ideas about humanity as an end in itself and incorporating them into a fuller account of the deliberative standpoint suggested by Kant’s ideal of moral legislation in a kingdom of ends. This is a framework for articulating and assessing mid-level moral principles, addressing conflicts among them, and considering possible exceptions. It is a basis for the later chapters here on practical issues. (shrink)

This chapter compares and contrasts rule-utilitarian and Kantian thinking about what moral rules should be accepted and what exceptions they should allow. We do not, and may never, know just what particular rules would maximize expected aggregate utility, and the relevant Kantian perspective is not a fully determinate decision procedure. So assessment by reference to putative counter-examples is unpromising. Nevertheless, the chapter offers four considerations for thinking that the Kantian _way of assessing moral rules_ is more plausible than the rule-utilitarian (...) way. The fundamental problem is that rule-utilitarianism gives an inadequate account of _relevant moral reasons_ even if it does not clearly lead to counter-intuitive conclusions. Promoting utility (the general welfare, preference satisfaction, etc.) is not the only reason for moral permissions and requirements, for why certain commitments are morally worthy, and for why facts about the past matter. To have a right and moral permission to pursue one’s own projects in certain contexts, for example, it is not necessary that general adoption of a system of rules allowing it would maximize utility. Kantians and rule-utilitarians will no doubt agree that one should not in general commit murder to prevent a comparable murder, but arguably this is not _simply_ a matter of the utility of accepting moral codes permitting or forbidding it. Further, we may question whether it is _morally worthy_ to commit oneself to any set of rules _solely because_ they are utility maximizing. Finally, although rule-utilitarianism can be expected to favor moral codes with some backward-looking requirements regarding fidelity, reparations, gratitude, and just deserts, we may doubt that their moral force stems entirely from forward-looking estimates of their effects on aggregate welfare. (shrink)

This chapter reviews, highlights, and raises questions about themes in Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue, Part II of _The Metaphysics of Morals_. In a wide ranging discussion it comments briefly on the topics (1) how Kant’s normative ethics relates to science, metaphysics, metaethics, and philosophy of law, (2) how Kant’s first principles relate to more specific moral principles and judgments, (3) how Kant’s idea of duties to oneself compares to contemporary conceptions, (4) how Kant addresses the problems of moral negligence, self-deception, (...) and weakness, and (5) how to understand the role of the motive of duty in a virtuous life. The chapter emphasizes the constraints of law and justice on virtue, the moral (if not epistemological) priority of the first principles of ethics, and the irrelevance of many contemporary objections to Kant’s conception of duties to oneself. The chapter also highlights Kant’s important second order principles regarding due care in deliberation, self-scrutiny to expose excuses, and developing strength of will to resist temptations. The morally necessary motive of duty is interpreted, not as an extra duty added on each particular duty, but as the basic choice to maintain a pervasive attitude that puts moral responsibility before self-interest. (shrink)

First, this chapter asks how might the idea of humanity as an end guide policies regarding the _manner_ in which punishment is carried out insofar as this is independent of Kant’s official principles of law and justice? Those principles addressed the central questions about punishment: who should be punished, how much, by what means, and why? Kant’s official principles of punishment include a standard for the appropriate _amount_ of punishment for various offenses, but they do not determine every aspect of (...) how criminals are to be treated. Even if we provisionally assume that those principles are justifiable, then, we can usefully ask whether ethical considerations urge us to seek reforms in the manner in which just punishments are carried out. Second, setting aside the provisional acceptance of Kant’s official principles of punishment, what are the _implications of the humanity formula_ regarding those same questions of punishment: who should be punished, how much, by what means, and why? This chapter proposes is an admittedly un-Kantian thought experiment. Suppose that we were to reject or disregard Kant’s own theory of just punishment and yet accept my reconstruction of his humanity formula: what sort of practice of punishment, if any, would we as conscientious individuals advocate and support? Would the humanity formula, applied in this context, provide presumptive reasons for urging reforms for our current practices? Third, what lesson should we draw from the discrepancy between the results of the last section and some of Kant’s official principles of punishment? Arguably, the humanity formula, applied independently of Kant’s official theory of justice, would endorse policies in conflict with aspects of that official theory. The conflict calls into question his official principles of punishment and the special distinction between law and ethics on which the principles rest. Unless these can be adequately justified on independent grounds, the ideals encapsulated in the humanity formula would require modification of those official principles. (shrink)

This chapter reviews the background in Kant’s moral psychology, suggests how weakness of will might be understood in Kant’s theory, and comments on the implications for moral responsibility. In brief, the proposal is this. For Kant, weakness of will is not a physical incapacity or disability but contrasts with virtue understood as developed strength of will to do our duty despite obstacles. The will is not literally a force, strong or weak, but is conceived as either law-giving practical reason (_Wille_) (...) or choice to act on a maxim (_Willkür_). Morally weak persons choose to act on particular maxims in conflict with both practical reason and their general maxim to act as they should. Our general life-governing maxims, like laws of the state, may be weak in content (vague and indeterminate) or willed weakly (with little provision for implementation). Moral weakness mitigates culpability without excusing. Contrary to some interpretations, weak-willed bad acts are, in an important sense, freely chosen and not necessarily failed efforts to act well. How this is possible, in Kant’s view, cannot be explained empirically or metaphysically. (shrink)

This chapter sketches a Kantian deliberative perspective, the moral presumption in favor of humanitarian interventions, relevant practical considerations, and Kant’s apparently inflexible opposition to any forcible intervention in the governance or constitution of another state. The critical questions then are: (1) Does a government’s responsibility to its citizens prohibit intervention primarily for the sake of citizens of other countries? (2) Does the case for humanitarian intervention depend on illegitimate ideas about the right to punish or forfeiture of the right to (...) govern? (3) Does forceful intervention in the governance of another state necessarily violate the rights of the citizens of that state? At issue are relations among ethics, law, and international relations. The chapter concludes that (1) Kant’s ethics rightly indicates that there is a presumption in favor of humanitarian interventions in some cases, (2) he wisely points to grounds for caution, avoiding punitive motives, and respecting the reasonable will of the citizens in other states, but (3) in the arguments reviewed here Kant did not provide adequate reasons for an absolute prohibition of humanitarian interventions in all cases. (shrink)

An earlier paper, “Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments,” argued that those who despoil the natural environment often express objectionable attitudes rooted in ignorance, self-importance, and patterns of aesthetic insensitivity that, if not themselves vices, give evidence of deficiency in the natural bases of human excellences, such as proper humility, gratitude and aesthetic appreciation. The main point was that in order to show that environmental ethics is not all about rights and welfare it is not necessary to presuppose (...) that natural phenomena have intrinsic value in a metaphysical sense. Now, supposing there is a broader human virtue we might call appreciation of the good, the question is whether this could be manifested by appreciating aspects of nature as good in themselves. Those who are already committed to the intrinsic value as a metaphysical property should have no objection to this idea, but they typically regard the value of nature as prior to and totally independent of human capacities for appreciation. Arguably the relation is not so simple and one-directional. Values are not natural or non-natural properties that we perceive as pre-existing in a non-human world, but they are also not simply things we create or mere reflections of our subjective tastes. The philosophical challenge is to explain, without metaphysical obscurity or undue anthropocentrism, how and why it is good to value certain natural phenomena for their own sakes and to recognize and respond appropriately to the value they have, in a sense, independently of human rights and welfare. The explanation requires sensitivity to distinctions, reflected in ordinary language, between desiring and valuing, between valuing something and regarding it as valuable, and between regarding something as valuable for various purposes and regarding it as valuable in itself. (shrink)

This general introduction describes briefly the aims of this volume and the range of topics discussed. The general introduction also indicates briefly some of the more distinctive features of the book’s chapters, for example, development of a framework for deliberation from Kant’s later formulations of the Categorical Imperative, a critical stance towards Kant’s distinction between justice and virtue, and attention to practical questions about revolution, treatment of criminals, and humanitarian interventions. The introduction also notes ways in which the interpretations here (...) contrast with those of other commentators, for example, regarding moral weakness and whether it is possible to _will_ to do something one knows to be wrong. (shrink)

This introductory chapter presents a concise summary of major themes in Kant’s moral philosophy, broadly conceived. Topics include Kant’s _a priori_ method for basic questions, the special features of moral judgments, the formulations of the Categorical Imperative, justice and the moral obligation to obey the law, and ethics and religion.

Initially written for a conference on “objectivity” and “relativism” in ethics, this chapter distinguishes six different questions that fall under these general headings, and it comments briefly on Kant’s position regarding them. Then the chapter sketches a broadly Kantian position on two of the questions: _First_, how can basic moral principles guide and constrain deliberation about more specific moral principles? Regarding this, the chapter reviews Kant’s ideal of legislation in a moral commonwealth, interpreted as a deliberative procedure different from those (...) commonly (and perhaps more literally) attributed to Kant. This ideal, which is explained further and used in other chapters, is presented as a constructivist procedure for normative ethics that, unlike metaethical constructivisms, presupposes and makes use of basic moral values associated with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. The proposed legislative perspective is like contractualism in assuming legislators’ rational self-regard and willingness to reciprocate, but the Kantian perspective differs from contractualism in important respects. _Second_, how can a theory’s basic standards be defended? In response to this question, two Kantian strategies for vindicating basic principles are briefly described. Setting the stage for these strategies were Kant’s arguments that all previous moral theories were mistaken, and these arguments remain relevant to contemporary moral theories. Beyond this, the strategies in question are, first, to argue analytically that the basic principles are presupposed in common moral concepts and, second, to appeal to each person’s consciousness of what practical reason demands when duty conflicts with self-interest. These strategies of defense invite comparison with Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

The aim here is, _first_, to frame the question to be considered about the responsibility to resist oppression, _second_, to describe briefly three second order responsibilities especially pertinent to “by-standers,” _third_, to note some connections to often over-looked aspects of Kant’s ethics, and, _finally_, to suggest briefly how we might see neglect of these responsibilities as failures to respect both oneself and others. The main question here is not about what specifically to do in various contexts of oppression. It is (...) instead a prior question about certain forward-looking moral responsibilities of those who may be or become bystanders in oppressive conditions. The three special responsibilities are second-order responsibilities to exercise _due care_ in deliberation, to _scrutinize one’s motives_ for remaining passive, and to try to _develop virtue_ conceived as strength of will to do what is right despite obstacles. The three responsibilities are drawn from Kant’s later writings on ethics and religion, where Kant seems to take more seriously the problem that many moral failures are due to negligence rather than intentional wrongdoing. By neglect of the special second-order duties we contribute to the on-going oppression of others, but we also fail to respect ourselves properly insofar as we do not do what we can to implement our basic moral commitments. (shrink)

Kant’s denial of a right to revolution is famous, but he was an ardent supporter of the spirit of the French revolution. He acknowledged cases of conscientious refusal and passive resistance, and unlike Hobbes, thought standards of justice apply to rulers; but he argued against any right to overthrow a bad legal system governed by a tyrant. In a spirit critical of Kant but trying to understand his underlying thoughts, this chapter takes up these questions: How could Kant consistently express (...) enthusiasm for the French Revolution while denying a right to revolution? Does Kant have adequate arguments against a legal right to rebel against a tyrant? Do his arguments support his view that overthrowing the supreme legal authority is always morally wrong? Do the reasons implicit in his formulations of the Categorical Imperative, which ground his endorsement of passive resistance, justify revolution in certain conditions, despite what he himself concluded? (shrink)

This Conclusion summarizes the book. It begins by revisiting the book’s primary objective— to explore the connections between women’s status and various forms of political violence—and the new methods adopted to explore that objective, in particular the focus on four concepts related to women’s status: women’s inclusion, women’s rights, harm to women, and beliefs about women’s status. The chapter then summarizes the findings from each chapter, regarding those concepts, and contextualizes them within political science as it currently stands. The chapter (...) also addresses the limitations of the book and suggests both future research agendas and policy recommendations. It concludes by bringing gender equality back into the fold. (shrink)